Late last week, the Australian Research Council quietly made an announcement that sent shockwaves through the academic community.
The federal education minister, Jason Clare, blocked research funding to 13 projects “for reasons relevant to the security, defence or international relations of Australia”. This is more than double the number that have been vetoed on security grounds for any year since the research council was established in 2001.
Clare didn’t issue a press release about the matter and refused to go into more detail at a press conference a few days later.
This comes as Strider (an AI intelligence company) released a report showing more than 6,000 publications and collaborations between Australian researchers and institutions associated with China’s People’s Liberation Army since 2020.
Much of that research focused on high-risk technologies, like drones, artificial intelligence and radar and communications systems.
What is going on?
Why were the research grants refused?
Clare told reporters the grants were refused “for national interest reasons”. In a statement to parliament, he added the
decision has been taken to protect the integrity of Commonwealth funded research […]
He has not disclosed the researchers, institutions or risks which saw the projects being axed.
The Australian Research Council Act also requires the minister to deliver a statement to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security about the cancelled research. This will be classified and we shouldn’t expect any more details.
This has happened before
When the Australian Research Council was established in 2001, the education minister had the power to refuse funding for any reason.
Researchers despised the “ministerial veto” amid concerns of political interference into research.
Following a 2024 amendment, the only way the minister can veto a grant is for national security, defence or international relations reasons.
My 2025 research on the ministerial veto found only five applications to the research council have ever refused for national security, all of them lodged in 2021. Those applications were on lasers, communications and energy.
Unsurprisingly, details on those projects were not provided to me under freedom of information requests because they contained “commercial information” and “material obtained in confidence”.
A new framework
Last week, the research council also launched a new “Research Security Framework”, replacing the “Countering Foreign Interference Framework” released in November 2025. The framework outlines how the council responds to research security risks throughout all stages of a grant.
The new framework says it expects universities will
avoid the submission of applications posing threats to Australia’s security, defence and international relations.
But it’s difficult to know how universities can meet that expectation if they don’t know what the risks are.
The need to strike a balance
As minister, Clare has to strike a balance between secrecy and transparency.
We don’t want applicants to know precisely how the research council looks at research applications. That might allow them to “game” the system. Researchers might not include certain keywords in their proposals, for instance, or leave out people they later want to work with.
Think of it like a loan application to your bank: if you know what they are looking for, you might alter your income or expenses so you look like a stronger candidate.
We also need to protect the privacy of the researchers involved. Not getting funding is bad enough for your research career. Imagine being labelled a “risk to national security”.
Yet without at least some details, we lose the ability to learn and prevent future refusals.
What this means for Australian research
Previously the government has viewed research security mainly as an issue of “foreign interference” – or other countries stealing our sensitive data.
But as I have argued, it is much broader than that. We’re seeing deliberate efforts from other countries to insert malicious insiders into research teams and projects, target researchers who might have access to classified information and exploit data and cyber vulnerabilities in universities.
Universities in Australia have to foot the bill for research security. Some countries are more advanced than Australia in some technologies – not doing the research could mean lost funding, prestige or rankings. So this may lead to risky research or collaborations. No wonder Australia has been lagging behind international counterparts in research security measures.
While some academics suggest the risks are overblown and we need to protect international collaboration, the latest developments indicate the government is acknowledging increased risks to Australia’s research.
This means researchers will need to pay much more attention to the national security implications of their work. Can it be militarised or weaponised? Is it being conducted with high-risk foreign entities?
What is needed next?
The recent decisions also highlight the fragmented nature of Australian research security.
A major report on research development in Australia, released by the Department of Industry only two months ago, doesn’t mention security of research at all.
The Australian Research Council has highlighted how Australian research security currently “lives” in 11 different laws and policies spread across five different ministers. The sector has every right to be confused.
The United Kingdom is tipped to launch a research security strategy later this year. Experts – including myself – are calling on the Australian government to do the same, so we have proper national coordination on this vitally important issue.
Brendan Walker-Munro is an adjunct Expert Associate for the National Security College of the Australian National University, Australia, and a Distinguished Research Fellow of the Social Cyber Institute. He has performed paid consultations for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor
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